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Introduction 
The technocratic management of money—embodied in the practices of central 
banks— has long been the underlying restructuring mechanism of national 
economies and polities under capitalism. Monetary policy has become an 
increasingly attractive tool for governments particularly in the post-2008 global 
crisis context. Nowhere is this phenomenon perhaps more apparent than in 
Europe’s periphery where the sharpening and irresolvable contradictions of the 
global crisis of capitalism and democracy manifest themselves more discernably. 
The cases of Hungary and Turkey are a case in point. Given this observation, this 
article explores the question: how can we conceptualize the direction of 
monetary policy in the European periphery1 in the post-2008 context?  
 
We approach this question from the perspective that monetary policymaking is 
fundamentally connected to the political domain and the totality of capitalist 
social relations. First, we propose to conceptualize the direction of monetary 
policy in Hungary and Turkey as a process of (re)politicisation with a 
characteristically repressive drift. The constitutive elements of the political 
discourse throughout the late 2000s in both countries emphasize, on the one 
hand, the victimization of the countries under the neoliberal austerity 
prescriptions of global financial capital and its “foreign” representatives and 
“lobbies.” On the other hand, this discourse emphasizes so-called “illiberal” 
development strategies. In both countries, this right-wing nationalist discourse 
appeals to wide swaths of the population comprising marginalized socio-
economic groups while preserving the capitalist status quo. Second, the process 
of politicisation has diverged in both countri s. In the Hungarian case, we identify 
numerous strategies by the political executive to exercise overt control over the 
management of money legally and institutionally. In Turkey, alongside the 
changing discourse, we observe a similar trajectory of governmental 
politicisation in other issue and policy areas alongside an active and systematic 
repression of progressive, radical left politicizations. However such a trend in 
monetary policymaking has not been as visible in Turkey as in the Hungarian case 
until recently. Nevertheless, the lack of visibility does not mean such 
governmental politicising efforts have not taken place in Turkey2. Third, our 
exploratory research highlights the importance of understanding the processes 
and goals of both depoliticisation and politicisation, on the one hand, and their 
(un)intended consequences, on the other. This is possible if we have a contextual 
understanding of these processes linked to the historical specificity of capitalist 
social relations, state-form and modes of governance in each country. Such a 
stance allows for a two-layered critique of the so-called “orthodox” and 
“unorthodox” economic policies of the capitalist states without presenting one 
as an alternative to the other. 
The mainstream scholarship on central bank independence and independent 
regulatory agencies have long tended to assert the innate effectiveness of 
distancing decision making mechanisms from elected officials and politicians due 
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to latter’s presumed clientalistic, populist and corruptive tendencies (Kydland 
and Prescott, 1977, Barro and Gordon, 1983; Cukierman, 1992). These 
approaches can provide insights into investigating the particular relations 
between elected and appointed state managers and address the aforementioned 
symptoms of clientalism and corruption within the ranks of the state. While they 
highlight the urgency of these symptomatic issues, they do not provide a 
comprehensive account of the root causes of such tendencies.  
 
We contend that this is because in large part they build on an externally defined 
relationship between state and societal processes; separating the study of the 
structure and functioning of governmental actions and processes from societal 
dynamics. Moreover, these approaches often carry the implicit objective of 
achieving a set of desirable outcomes in economic management and governance  
– the normative basis of which are often taken for granted as capitalist, 
neoliberal and orthodox. Thus, the drastic distributional effects and “social 
welfare function” (or lack thereof) of monetary policies—that is, their class 
character—which result in systematic income transfers from the working classes 
to the financial capital are sidelined and neglected (Watson, 2002: 187). In the 
absence of acknowledging these facets of monetary policymaking, we argue that 
the mainstream approaches fall short of fully accounting for the public 
disenchantment with global capitalism, financial establishment and economic 
orthodoxy which systematically produce social inequalities, asymmetries and 
exclusion as the underlying reasons behind post-crisis politicisations. 
 
Within the critical strand of political economy, the transformations in this 
contested policy field have been assessed on the basis of a set of depoliticisation 
strategies. That is to say: removing the decision making powers and responsibility 
away from the elected state managers in arms’ length fashion (Burnham, 1999, 
2001, 2014; Kettell, 2004, Rogers, 2009, 2013). The analytical strength of this 
scholarship, which builds broadly on the Conference of Socialist Economists (CSE) 
approach to state and global capitalism, emanates from its holistic approach to 
forms of governing and social relations. It allows the researcher to position the 
transformations that take place at policy level within a broader social and 
political critique. It accounts for their relational and conflict-ridden dynamics 
based on the class character of the social relations underlying them (Bonefeld, 
2014).  
 
This critical scholarship, however, has largely focused on the experience of core 
capitalist countries in their empirical research and theory building. This article 
aims to conceptually capture the recent trend of central banking politicisation in 
Turkey and Hungary and, subsequently, raises the question of whether it carries 
within it objectives of depoliticisation in these countries- an observation recently 
made in the post-crisis UK context as well (Burnham, 2014). In so doing, we refer 
to the observation that repressive modes of governing in both countries risks 
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locking in the politicised monetary policy and isolating it from progressive public 
critique and contestation. Therefore, we put forward a double-faceted critique of 
both the pre-crisis depoliticising policy prescriptions (Holmes, 2014) and the 
post-2008 politicisation in both countries. In our view a political economy 
approach which explicitly problematises the capital logic and class character of 
policymaking processes under capitalism is required to put forward such a 
comprehensive critique. On this basis the article presents reflections from an 
exploratory analysis of two case-studies with a specific focus on monetary policy. 
It aims to make a contribution to this critical scholarship through an illustration 
of these country cases. 
 
In the first section, we present the conceptual tools at our disposal. The second 
section provides a rationale for case selection and methods. The third section 
assesses the historical background in both countries, with a particular focus on 
the depoliticisation trajectory preceding the 2008 global and European crisis. The 
final section assesses the post-2008 politicisation developments of central 
banking and central bank-state relations in both countries. In conclusion, we 
reflect on the insights drawn from these cases for broader debates and studies 
into (de)politicisation and critical political economy. 
 
1- State, Crisis and (De)politicisation in the Management of Money 
In this article we adopt the view that the processes of (de)politicisation should be 
understood within a critical account of the state as a form of social relations and 
the role of state managers in the management of these crisis-ridden social 
relations (Clarke, 1991; Burnham, 1994; Bonefeld et. al., 1995; Bonefeld, 2014). 
Such an approach explicitly problematises the economic-political separation in 
capitalism that is taken for granted by the mainstream approaches and aims to 
demystify the existing power relations that it conceals and perpetuates. Through 
this critical lens, the necessarily conflictual and short-term orientation of the 
depoliticisation processes could be understood as facing constant opposition 
from politicising dynamics. In particular, these are intensified under crisis 
conditions, forcing the governments and politicians to reiterate and reinstate 
depoliticisation in various forms (Bonefeld et. al., 1995; Burnham, 2001, 2014; 
Kettell, 2004; Rogers, 2009; Sutton, 2016). 
 
On this basis, the most prevalent definition of depoliticisation in the existing 
literature is the one developed by Peter Burnham with specific reference to the 
Blair government’s economic policies in the 1990s. Burnham defines 
depoliticisation as: 
 
placing at one remove the political character of decision-making. In many 
respects, state managers retain arm’s-length control over crucial 
economic and social processes whilst simultaneously benefiting from the 
distancing effects of depoliticisation... By switching from a politicised 
Page 3 of 27
URL: http:/mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cnpe
New Political Economy
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
4 
 
(discretion-based) to a depoliticised (rule-based) system, governments 
establish credible rules for economic management, thereby altering 
expectations concerning wage claims, in addition to 'externalising' 
responsibility for the imposition of financial discipline (2001: 128). 
 
Depoliticisation is conceived here as a governing strategy and, therefore, retains 
its political character, albeit appearing otherwise. Recent research has drawn on 
this framework to move it beyond the governmental sphere (Hay, 2007: 82-9) 
and proposed “governmental/societal/discursive depoliticisation” on the basis of 
the actors and forms involved in particular issue areas and contexts (Wood and 
Flinders, 2014).  
 
A similar set of subtleties and complexities can be found with respect to the 
conceptualisation of politicisation. However, it remains more underspecified, 
leading to multiple, sometimes conflicting definitions and normative values 
attributed to it. In the mainstream thinking, the link between unorthodox 
economic policy and politicisation hinges on the notion of discretionary 
monetary policy, where the electoral cycle is coupled with the business cycle for 
“short-term electoral expediency” (Hay, 2007: 115).  This more discretionary 
monetary policy then translates into control and management of governance by 
the executive, and autonomy of the said body is decreased. Unlike the 
mainstream scholarship which approaches these dynamics in a rather formalistic, 
binary fashion devoid of political content, the notion gains a critical character 
when, as outlined above, it is conceived within a broader perspective of diverse 
governing strategies of the capitalist states in historical perspective. 
It is therefore crucial to specify what/which issue area is being (re)politicised, by 
whom and in what way/form in order to provide a meaningful critical 
assessment. In other words, instead of conceiving of (de)politicisation ‘in 
general’, we approach it as cases of (de)politicisation ‘in particular’ to be 
understood in contextual terms. 
 
In this article, we conceive monetary policy to be closely connected with the 
governing forms of broader capitalist social relations of which the state is a 
constitutive part. Against this background, the term governmental politicisation 
will refer to the act of returning visibility to the political character and control of 
decision making by the government through substantive policy measures. 
Relatedly, discursive politicisation will address the rhetorical problematisation of 
an alleged need to politicise decision making by the state managers (with or 
without fully materialising in governmental politicisation or at times 
accompanied with the depoliticisation strategy). 
 
Since the late 1970s, orthodox monetary policy has come to entail a “dedication 
to price stability”which implies the seemingly non-negotiable subordination of 
so-called “real macro-economic outcomes” (e.g., (un)employment, real GDP and 
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its growth rate) to maintaining the stability of the price level, as well as fiscal 
discipline) (Tobin, 1999: 14). In this context central bank independence is 
conceived as a means to thwarting the “political business cycle” problem 
lamented by neoliberal and public choice theorists and “widely promoted by a 
range of international institutions, such as the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund, and the European Commission, as the most effective guarantor 
of sound monetary policy” (Hay, 2007: 113). Otherwise, in the interest of winning 
office, “rational political actors” are incentivized to set inflation targets “that they 
have no intention of keeping” while market actors will theoretically “anticipate” 
inflation—a response resulting in higher average unemployment, inflation, and 
interest rates, as well as lower levels of investment (Alesina, 1989; Kydland and 
Prescott, 1977 in Hay, 2007: 114). Not bound by electoral commitments 
independent professional central bankers could treat “potential[ly] public and 
political disputes about appropriate instruments and settings” as “purely private 
and technical matters” (Hay, 2007: 116-17).  
 
From 2008 onwards, however, we observe an emerging trend of a re-
consideration, critique and, in certain cases, reversal of the prior orthodox 
strategies pursued in economic management (Morgan, 2009; Mojon, 2010; 
Mackintosh, 2014, Moschella, 2015). Especially evident from the early 2010s, 
these gradual and often ad-hoc changes in central banking practices across the 
globe have been accompanied by a discursive turn towards attributing a more 
active role to central banks in matters of growth, financial stability and 
employment (Cukierman, 2011). The crisis has also thrown into question the 
alleged credibility and trust of central bank policies in the eyes of the public 
(Walti, 2012; Roth et. al., 2014). Against this background, we turn our attention 
to the two country cases to trace both the material and discursive changes in 
central banking and what they mean in terms of a larger scale transformation of 
state and social relations in times of crisis. 
 
2- Case Selection and Methods  
Turkey and Hungary have often been analysed in the scholarship as exceptional 
cases within their respective designated geographies of Central and Eastern and 
Southeastern Europe. Often particularistic and Eurocentric theoretical 
frameworks have been employed, perpetuating and deepening the stand-alone 
characteristics of each country case, in their deviation from the Western 
European ideal type. Recent monetary policy changes in both countries have 
been previously assessed either in single case study design (Bakir, 2007; Akcay, 
2009) or in comparative research design which was positioned within the 
geographical cluster of Central and Eastern Europe (Mero and Piroska, 2016).  
 
Both countries underwent substantive restructuring in the pre-2008 context in 
line with both the framework of the Washington consensus and subsequent EU 
accession requirements (Sadler and Swain, 1994: 390-1; Bedirhanoglu, 2007: 
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1246-8; Bohle and Greskovits, 2007: 109, Bakir and Onis, 2010; Sonmez, 2011; 
Gagyi, 2016).The global crisis from 2008 onwards has similarly witnessed the 
emergence of a period of questioning and revision of the pre-2008 policies.   
Even though Hungary is an official EU member and Turkey is a candidate country, 
we contend that, within the scope of the management of money, the positioning 
of both economies outside the immediate Eurozone and official control of ECB 
makes them plausible cases for exploring the common and divergent strategies 
of the monetary policymakers within the structural constraints and autonomy 
provided in such a context. 
 
Therefore the two countries set the ground for the assessment of both complex 
similarities and differences within a common conceptual framework, while 
critically exploring the plausibility of the said framework beyond established 
cases in an effort to challenge particularistic, Eurocentric approaches outlined 
above (George and Bennett, 2005: 19-22; 75-6; 83). To this end a qualitative, 
exploratory two-case study approach is adopted on the basis of critical textual 
analysis and supportive evidence from semi-structured interviews conducted in 
both countries.  
 
Such an approach allows us to retain flexibility to pose a wider number of 
research questions in order to assess the suitability of the conceptual toolkit of 
depoliticisation/politicisation. Focusing on these country cases in an interrelated, 
exploratory manner but not in strictly comparative terms, also cautions against 
producing rigid periodisation and categorization along ideal typical models. It 
allows room to assess the changing direction of monetary policymaking in its 
open-ended, dynamic character (Yin, 2003). Since both the material objectives 
and discursive justifications and the broader social and political impact of the 
unfolding politicisation as articulated and practiced by policymakers are under 
scrutiny, qualitative methods are deemed most appropriate in both country cases 
in order to identify and give meaning to these mechanisms in depth. 
 
The article presents evidence from two prior, independent in-depth case studies 
(author details removed). In the case of Turkey, key resources include CBRT’s 
annual reports, press releases, interest rate decisions and online media coverage 
in the post-2001 context. In addition the article draws on the semi-structured 
interviews that were conducted in Ankara and Istanbul with the former senior 
CBRT officials in 2009-2010 period. The interviewees were asked open-ended 
questions regarding their involvement in monetary policy formulation and 
implementation in the post-2001 context, the central bank-government-treasury 
relations, degree of independence that the central bank and its staff exercised vis 
a vis the government, business associations and trade unions in comparison to 
the pre-2001 period. However gaining access to interview current CBRT officials 
has not been possible. Given this limitation to investigate the internal 
transformation and politicisation of central banking in the post-2010 period, the 
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online database of parliamentary deliberations available from the website of 
Grand National Assembly of Turkey for the 1999-2015 period was also consulted 
in order to gain insight into the content of the more recent and ongoing debates 
surrounding the central bank, government-central bank relations and the forms 
of framing of monetary policy considerations in the assembly. In the case of 
Hungary, key resources include the National Bank of Hungary (MNB)’s annual 
reports, time-series data on monetary council decisions, minutes of the 
monetary council meetings, official opinions of the European Central Bank, press 
coverage available online and semi-structured, open-ended interviews with 
central bank insiders conducted during 2013, reflecting a mixed profile of policy 
preferences (i.e., orthodox approach versus new “unorthodox” approaches of 
the Fidesz-KDNP ruling government). The questions focused on what different 
respondents emphasized and considered salient in terms of the MNB’s policy 
goals, functions, and organizational culture under Governor Simor and changes 
under Governor Matolcsy during the ruling Fidesz-KDNP government. 
 
3- Brief historical background in the pre-2008 context: Integration into the global 
capitalist system and depoliticisation 
With the neoliberal capitalist restructuring of the national economies in the 
aftermath of the global crisis in the late 1970s, the depoliticisation attempts took 
the monetary form of disciplining through the initial promotion of privatisation 
and financialisation in Hungary and Turkey with the full support of the IMF and 
World Bank as noted earlier (Boratav, 1990)3. In the Turkish context, privatisation 
efforts remained partial and incomplete despite substantial sales of large scale 
public sector companies and institutions, partly due to an emerging public sector 
workers’ movement and unionising from 1987 onwards. Eventually 
financialisation was forced to support the rolling over of public debt, which 
remained consistently high and fed the crisis dynamics of the 1990s, with the 
simultaneous development of fictitious capital accumulation (Akcay, 2009; 
Gungen, 2010). 
 
In the case of Hungary, the integration into the global circuit of capital visibly 
accelerated from 1989 onwards when the country officially became one of the 
Central and East European ‘transition’ countries (Borocz, 2000; 2012; Gagyi and 
Eber, 2015; Gagyi, 2016; Gerocs and Pinkasz, 2017). Gerocs and Pinkasz (2017), 
with specific reference to the accumulation dynamics in the automative industry, 
argue that this integration has increasingly taken a dependent form with large 
scale privatisations, the foreign direct investment flows especially in electronics 
and car manufacturing sectors and European Union transfers as part of the global 
restructing of capital and labour in this period4. 
 
3.1 The strategy of depoliticisation: The 2000s in Turkey and Hungary 
A series of crises (currency/banking in Turkey and debt/fiscal in Hungary) 
catapulted both countries onto the path of depoliticisation in central banking—
Page 7 of 27
URL: http:/mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cnpe
New Political Economy
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
8 
 
the accepted conventional wisdom of the late 1980s and 1990s. The 2000-2001 
financial crisis emerged as a key turning point for the thorough restructuring of 
social relations in Turkey. The double crises (November 2000 and February 2001) 
initially occurred as a currency and banking crisis which, as it unfolded, revealed 
the more serious structural problems inherent in capital accumulation and policy 
making (Akyuz and Boratav, 2003; Yeldan, 2002). As a number of interviewees 
suggest, the state managers, especially in the Treasury and Central Bank, had 
been continuously deliberating the idea of putting forward a thorough 
depoliticisation agenda during the 1990s. However restructuring could not be 
initiated until the crisis broke.  
 
The outcome of the process was a de facto technocratic government in the post-
2001 context and the appointment of one of the Vice Governors of the World 
Bank to the post of Minister of Economy5. The ongoing ascendancy of the 
technocrats in economic policy making throughout the 1990s, a development 
which also took place in Hungary (Gagyi, 2015; Gerocs and Pinkasz, 2017), 
especially those of the Treasury and the Bank vis-à-vis the State Planning 
Organisation and Finance Ministry is noteworthy here. This is reflected in the fact 
that the IMF carried out negotiations primarily with the Treasury, the CBRT 
technocrats and only the Minister of State responsible for economy from the 
Cabinet as a number of interviewees noted. In other words the rule of the 
market was reinserted on social relations through independent regulatory 
agencies in the banking sector, agricultural and energy markets and, 
fundamentally, the disinflation strategy of an independent central bank (Bakir, 
2007). 
 
While in Hungary there was no such landmark crisis in the same period, widely 
accepted orthodox monetary policies were already being implemented under 
then-governor Gyorgy Surányi of the MNB (1995-2001). Suranyi was appointed 
by Prime Minister Gyula Horn, who was facing runaway economic debt in the 
mid-1990s and appointed several “pragmatic problem solvers” into his 
administration (Inglot, 2003: 227, Hungarian Spectrum, 2009). Surányi was 
widely credited with bringing inflation under control, and helping transform the 
MNB ‘into a truly independent central bank’ (Kopits, 2014: 104). Similar to the 
Turkish case, this central banking approach remained largely unquestioned and 
taken for granted throughout the 2000s. Even in the midst of crisis (2007-2013), 
the orthodox position was notably reflected in the bank’s discourse about price 
stability and the emphasis on caution or risk aversion in times of crisis (e.g., 
MNB, 2012: 11, 18; Johnson & Barnes, 2015: 548). 
 
Between 2001 and 2005, albeit numerous crisis potentialities in national and 
global terms, depoliticisation efforts through central bank independence has 
delivered relatively “positive” material outcomes from the point of view of state 
managers in Turkey as interviewees also highlighted. Among them were reduced 
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inflation, growth recovery, enhanced competitiveness, increased capital inflows 
in line with the priorities and objectives of the policy. However high 
unemployment rate coupled with a mounting private consumer debt problem 
and difficulties to depoliticise the tax and social security system persisted and 
deepened in this period simultaneously (CBRT Data, Annual Reports, 2002-2006). 
Bakir and Onis (2010: 79-80) explain these discrepancies in policy outcomes with 
the overemphasis of the reforms on ‘prudential regulation’ without sufficient 
attention paid to the rapid financialisation of the Turkish economy in this period. 
This process has further led to debt-led growth with dire consequences for 
income distribution away from households to the financial sector (ibid: 79). 
 
In terms of its impact on public debate, the political interest and controversy 
over monetary policy indeed largely increased in this period in Turkey. However, 
following Kettell (2008), the form and character of the interest demonstrated the 
short-term “success” of the depoliticisation strategy since the Central Bank was 
largely on target with most criticisms and controversy over monetary policy- 
shielding the governments from the effects of unpopular policies (Akcay, 2009).  
 
The pre-2013 period of central banking in Hungary came to be associated with a 
quintessential marriage between the doctrine of monetary orthodoxy and 
notions of independent and non-bureaucratic, cooperative working methods as 
many interviewees emphasized. It lasted until the Pandora’s box of the global 
financial crisis was opened and the financial sector came to be discursively 
associated not with independent, intellectual prudency as propagated, but with 
the reign of concentrated capitalist interest—backed by foreign interests and 
central banks. The effects of crisis eventually engulfed Hungary - and a land-slide 
election victory for the right-wing opposition (Fidesz-KDNP) to boot – was a game 
changer. The global financial crisis hit households and small businesses struggling 
to repay loans denominated in foreign currency. The new ruling coalition used 
the occasion to bring the virtues of orthodoxy to a debate and to exercise 
unprecedented political power over financial institutions, including the Central 
Bank, as well as in other policy areas (Szikra, 2014; Johnson and Barnes, 2015; 
see also author details removed).    
 
4- The emerging politicisation trajectory: The Impact of the 2008 Crisis and its 
Aftermath 
In the context of the latest global crisis and austerity, several questions arise with 
regards to the mission of central banks. The deepening of the crisis has called for 
more systemic and holistic responses in a political environment which has 
increasingly come to question the alleged credibility and legitimacy of the 
doctrine of independent central banking. From a critical political economy 
perspective, this process was closely linked to the return of Keynesian thinking 
and the resulting re-invention of the role of the state in the economy (Inman, 
2013; Economist, 2016).  
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Within this context the following section analyses the manifestations and 
processes of post-crisis politicisation of central banking in Hungary and Turkey, in 
terms of commonalities and divergent trends.  
 
4.1 The manifestations of discursive politicisation of monetary policy in Turkey 
and Hungary 
We trace similar processes of discursive politicisation in both countries, involving 
verbal attacks on central bank policies and the articulation of domestic 
alternatives to accepted policy doctrine. However, in the case of Turkey, the form 
of discursive politicisation was directed at the CBRT’s policy decisions. 
Substantive politicisation was reserved for other domains of economic policy.   
Not dissimilarly, in the case of Hungary, verbal attacks levelled at the MNB 
occurred in conjunction with the pursuit of the politicisation of other domains of 
economic policy led by then-Minister of National Economy, Gyorgy Matolcsy who 
would later be appointed Governor of the MNB. The MNB’s discursive 
politicisation served as a harbinger of the institution’s subsequent governmental 
politicisation. 
 
In Turkey, two seriously contested policy rate increases took place in the summer 
of 2006 and in the autumn of 2008 at the onset of the global crisis (CBRT Annual 
Reports, 2006-8). It was also a period in which a major controversy over the 
appointment of the new Bank Governor (Durmus Yilmaz took office in 2006 for a 
period of five years) and the government's proposal to move the location of the 
Bank from Ankara to Istanbul broke out (Akcay, 2009: 254-280).  
 
This period reflected the consolidation of the depoliticising impact of the 
strategy on the level and quality of public debate (Hay and Watson, 1999; Kettell, 
2008). There were a number of rhetorical threats from within the government to 
reverse the Bank‘s independence and explicit controversy between the 
government and the Bank over its alleged “high interest rate, low exchange rate” 
policy, as reflected in the wide media coverage (Ankara Chamber of Commerce, 
2007; Ozatay, 2007; Sonmez, 2007). However, no such reversal actually took 
place. Instead the government exploited the opportunities of having transmitted 
its control over monetary policy to the independent central bank by jumping into 
the bandwagon of criticizing the Bank alongside business and exporters 
associations and unions. The Bank ultimately lowered policy rates from 
September 2007 and November 2008 onwards after the brief increases between 
May-July 2008 as an initial reaction to the global crisis (CBRT Interest Rates). 
 
Nevertheless, these developments did not result in fully fledged adoption of an 
‘unorthodox’ position in economic policy making due to the state managers' 
efforts to ensure that certain pillars of economic policymaking remained 
seemingly outside the political process6. On the other hand, the government 
articulated a discourse which repeatedly promised the signing of a new IMF 
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stand-by agreement from May 2008 onwards in order to garner credibility 
without an actual commitment (Financial Times, 5 Dec 2008; 27 Jan, 10 Feb, 16 
May, 20 June 2009). This stance presented the crisis as though it were outside 
the dynamics of the Turkish economy. It was argued that the economy proved 
much more resilient than it had been in the pre-2001 period (Prime Minister 
Speeches, Sep-Dec 2008; see also Onis and Guven, 2011).  
 
An overview of the content of parliamentary debates during the 2007-2010 
period reveals that a set of criticisms were initiated against the effects of the 
Bank's monetary and credit policies on the “real” sector (Parliamentary Debates, 
23. Term, 1-4 Legislative Years). By late 2008, the Ministers responsible for 
economy came to explicitly acknowledge the effects of the deepening crisis on 
the domestic economy (3. Legislative Year 17.Meeting 13/Nov/2008 Thursday, p. 
33). Nevertheless the-then Prime Minister and the Finance Minister were still 
insistent that “this is not an economic crisis but a financial crisis” and that “this 
crisis is not Turkey's crisis, this is a global crisis” (28. Meeting 16/Dec/2008 
Tuesday, p. 13, 67-8). The rhetoric of “turning crisis into opportunity” and 
emphasis on the “inevitability of change to which everyone needs to adapt” 
complemented this representation of crisis and restructuring (ibid., p. 13, 15). 
The 2009 budget deliberations set off heated debates in the parliament, 
including discussions on the substantial modifications of the CBRT’s mandate. As 
a member of parliament stated: “The Central Bank must definitely take initiative 
in this process. [It] must be taken toward a policy orientation to look out for the 
real economy beyond its focus on the inflation target, monetary and credit 
policies.” (79. Meeting 21/Apr/2009 Tuesday, p. 7). 
 
However, the Ministers' response to these challenges did not fundamentally 
divert from the depoliticisation principle in monetary policy making as they 
reiterated the importance of the CBRT's independence (37. Meeting 
25/Dec/2008 Thursday, p. 126). Without explicitly impinging on the official 
status, institutional structure and governing of the Bank, the AKP government 
had instead chosen to politicise other areas of economic policy, namely fiscal 
policy and borrowing via increases in the Treasury borrowing limit (37. Meeting 
25/Dec/2008 Thursday, p. 127), incentive/stimulus packages for select sectors 
and industries and a new public finance and debt management law (110. 
Meeting 25/Jun/2009, Thursday, p. 41).  
 
The transformation of the crisis into a European sovereign debt crisis across the 
continent from 2010 onwards has had a lasting effect. This period also set off the 
formulation of a policy mix towards ‘a flexible monetary policy’ with “lower 
policy rates, a wider interest corridor and higher required reserve ratios” with a 
renewed and explicit mandate to uphold financial stability alongside price 
stability (CBRT AR, 2010: 27, 32, 43; CBRT Press Releases, No: 2011-23, 26-27, 29, 
40-41; CBRT website). These changes appear to have aimed at striking the 
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balance between two objectives at the same time: providing the required 
amount of money into circulation to offset recessionary effects, facilitate the 
conditions for accumulation and avoid any medium-term inflationary effects and 
exchange rate risks due to the relaxed credit mechanism and easier borrowing 
conditions from the Bank (CBRT AR, 2010). In terms of the way these measures 
have been discussed in the public political domain, the occasional calls for the 
change of CBRT mandate to include the objectives of “production and 
employment”, the overhaul of the floating exchange rate regime and the issue of 
CBRT's location change from Ankara to Istanbul further intensified in the 2010-
2011 period (Parliamentary Debates, 4th and 5th Legislative years; Jul, Dec 2010; 
Jan-Feb 2011). The uncertainty surrounding the change of CBRT governor in 2011 
also became a matter of contestation in this period. The “policy mix” has 
continued with intensifying foreign exchange interventions by the Bank to 
overcome periods of volatility and stabilize the exchange rate. Continuous 
appraisals as well as criticisms within the public debate have accompanied this 
process as to whether this amorphous policy toolkit is and could indeed be a 
successful one (Hurriyet, 4 Jan 2012; 8 Jan 2012; Parliamentary Debates, 24th 
Term, 2nd Legislative Year, Dec 2011). We observe that the post-2010 period was 
marked more by the debate and contestation over the exchange rate, growth and 
the current account deficit than inflation targeting and price stability (Hurriyet, 9 
Jan, 26 Jan 2012)7. 
 
In the case of Hungary, we characterize the form of discursive politicisation as 
distinctly nationalist8 (articulation of domestic policy alternatives) and as a 
harbinger of governmental politicisation of the MNB. This politicisation of 
monetary policy unfolded in a particular context – that of the Fidesz-KDNP ruling 
coalition two-thirds majority electoral victory and “so-called” mandate in 2010, 
the fall out in Hungary from the global financial crisis and recession, and the 
2014 elections in which Fidesz-KDNP were expected to retain power. These major 
events and their consequences led to a markedly more nationalist economic 
policy discourse on the part of the ruling coalition, emphasizing Hungary’s 
independence from the external influence of international financial institutions, 
credit rating agencies, and foreign banks (also reflected in its criticism of 
traditionally “western” and European values) and a call for national 
“cooperation” and “harmony” (Simon, 2011; K.A., 2013; K.M., 2013; Feher, 
2014).  Among Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s declarations were that the country 
“had let go of neo-liberal economic policy” (e.g., “letting go of the policy of 
austerity, just before [Hungary was] about to share the fate of Greece”). By 2014, 
Hungary had become “an economic success story, which Europe, too, is slowly 
beginning to acknowledge” (Orban, State of the Nation Address, 2015). “The 
most popular topic in thinking today is trying to understand how systems that are 
not Western, not liberal, not liberal democracies and perhaps not even 
democracies, can nevertheless make their nations successful,” citing China, 
Turkey, and Russia as examples (Orban, 2014). 
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Prime Minister referred to Hungary’s “new direction in 2010” as the moment 
when the “new era of national politics began” (Orban, State of the Nation 
Address, 2015). This new direction was synonymous with a rejection of foreign 
debt and a departure from liberal democratic politics more generally (Orban, 
2014; 2015). Feeding off of nationalist sentiment, including from voters who had 
moved to the far-right due partly to wider disenchantment with neoliberal 
economic policies, the government’s discourse centered on Hungary’s 
independence from debt-led growth, which was argued to have lasted between 
1960 and 2010 (ibid.). However it is crucial to emphasise that this discourse, 
albeit seemingly anti-liberal, was not anti-capitalist. 
 
Since coming into power in 2010, the ruling government had repeatedly clashed 
with the EU and the ECB regarding taxes, constitutional issues, central bank 
independence, as well as the foreign-currency loans (e.g., Feher, 2014). Much of 
this discourse was fueled by the foreign-currency loan fallout, in which hundreds 
of thousands of Hungarian borrowers’ monthly payments skyrocketed thanks to 
Central European currencies plummeting in value against the Swiss franc in 2008.  
The foreign banks which had initially sold these loans at formerly favorable 
exchange rates became the target of widespread public anger—an important 
factor in Fidesz-KDNP garnering a landslide victory in 2010. The ruling coalition 
took it upon itself to find a nationalist solution to the problem in the run up to 
the 2014 elections. It passed legislation allowing borrowers to convert 
outstanding loans from francs and euros into forints at market rates, while also 
burdening the (mostly foreign) banking sector with additional taxes (Economist, 
2014). The ruling coalition’s credibility was further augmented in 2013 when 
Hungary repaid to the IMF its outstanding debt of 2.5 billion euros “from a 2008 
emergency loan program” (Dunai & Szakacs, 2013) and the country was able to 
exit from the European Union’s excessive deficit procedure (Council of the 
European Union, 2013). Against the backdrop, the government could successfully 
position itself, both discursively and substantively, against the prevailing western 
dominance of its economy, including financial sector (Gagyi and Eber, 2015: 605-
6; Gagyi, 2016: 359-360). 
 
The engineer behind this discourse and subsequent policy measures was Gyorgy 
Matolcsy—a key figure inside the ruling Fidesz party and Prime Minister’s “’right-
hand man’” in economic affairs (Dunai, 2016)9. Together with the PM, he 
“spearheaded the government’s criticism of the [MNB],” criticizing its “’strong 
forint’ policy” and favoring some measure of inflation in order to kick start 
economic growth and avoid deflation (Buckley & Eddy, 2013; KA., 2013; Reuters, 
2013; author details removed). Moreover, in positioning himself as a defender of 
national interests, Matolcsy had openly “called on the four major credit rating 
agencies to start negotiations on Hungary’s rating upgrade,” as well as on “the 
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resignation of Olli Rehn” for having “conducted bad economic policy” at the 
European Commission (K.A., 2013).  
 
Matolcsy furthermore cited “traditional economic policy” as the reason for the 
ousting of 19 failed EU member state governments at the polls. According to the 
bank governor, the unorthodox path deviates from the traditional one because it 
is built on “solidarity” rather than “austerity” (K.M., 2013). There was also a 
tendency to cast Hungary’s direction as the new normal. Matolcsy had argued 
that the world’s largest central banks followed an unorthodox monetary policy 
after the great recession: “since August of last year, we, the majority of the 
monetary council were always right in this respect” (K.M., 2013).  
 
These statements are reflective of a repeated emphasis on the government’s 
overarching System of National Cooperation which was authored by Fidesz-KDNP 
with the supposed aim of defining the principles and common goals uniting 
Hungarian society (Lambert, 2016). There was a deliberate goal to “harmonize” 
fiscal and monetary policy (e.g., Than and Szakacs, 2012) and to aim for a 
“strategic partnership” between the MNB and the cabinet while adhering to 
price stability (e.g., Reuters, 2013)10. Thus, unlike in the case of Turkey, where 
discursive politicisation sustained depoliticised strategy in monetary policy 
materially, discursive politicisation in Hungary signaled and was part of an 
evolving substantive paradigm shift. 
 
4.2 Governmental politicisation of monetary policy in Hungary and reflections 
on Turkey  
This section analyses the governmental dimension of the MNB’s politicisation, 
with reflections on how the Turkish case thus differs. In the name of Fidesz-
KDNP’s overwhelming electoral mandate, nationalist policy discourses developed 
in the general context of increasing centralization and ministerial take-over of 
previously more-or-less independent organizations. Between 2010 and 2013, 
there has been a palpable endeavor to bring the Bank in line with the “electoral 
mandate”—a phrase often and strategically employed by the ruling coalition in 
its discursive defense of controversial policies. This is evidenced by Fidesz-KDNP’s 
controversial amendments to the MNB Act CCVIII of 2011 (author details 
removed)11. There were two rounds of political appointments to the MNB 
monetary council made under Fidesz-KDNP. The first turnover took place in 2011. 
The second shake-up in 2013 saw the replacement of Simor and his two 
deputies, with Matolcsy and three new deputies commencing the substantive 
policy changes at the MNB. Thereafter, the translation of the prevailing 
nationalist discourse into so-called unorthodox policy involved a pro-growth 
stance, including—among other measures—a preference for reducing and 
maintaining low interest rates, designing cheap, domestic financing instruments, 
the absorption of banking supervision (absorbing the Hungarian Financial 
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Supervisory Authority into the MNB), and the concept of “self-financing” in order 
to increase the bank deposit portfolio (MNB, 2014: 7). 
 
Matolcsy’s takeover also involved the passage of a new MNB Act entering into 
force on October 1, 2013. The Act integrated financial supervision and consumer 
protection functions into the central bank’s structure, and a Financial Stability 
Council was also established for micro and macro-prudential issues12. While the 
previous crisis years saw mixed responses (rate cuts, increases, and rates 
unchanged), 2013 was characterized by consecutive rate cuts.13  
 
The “policy dilemma” of the post-crisis period, or the problem of weak demand 
and subsequent calls for looser monetary policy, on the one hand, and 
persistently high inflation carrying implications for the medium-term, on the 
other, culminated in 2012 (MNB, 2012). The monetary council members 
appointed by the ruling coalition broke with the orthodox policy actors by the 
summer of 2012. From March 2013, with a new executive leadership at the helm, 
the Governor voted in favor of decreases for the remainder of the year, as did all 
other Fidesz-KDNP appointed members. The majority of council members 
continued to vote for rate reductions until August 2014 (Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 
no date). From August to December of 2014, members unanimously voted to 
maintain rates (Magyar Nemzeti Bank, no date). 
 
Similar to CBRT, MNB’s politicisation had been visibly manifested through its 
internal structural changes, which sparked criticism in the media among policy 
experts and analysts because they featured a markedly stronger emphasis on 
loyalty to government policies (e.g., via select hirings, firings, loyalty tests), a 
reinstituted hierarchical management structure, and a more politicised cadre of 
middle management (Varkonyi, 2013; Simon, 2013; Reuters, 2013; author details 
removed). In this scenario, the doctrine of orthodoxy and the sheltered ivory 
tower of knowledge were not only questioned, but incrementally and partially 
dismantled in the interest of a nationalist capitalist political and economic 
agenda, i.e., garnering a secure super majority from the economically and 
politically disenchanted working classes and electorate in the context of crisis. 
The MNB’s path to ‘unorthodoxy’ was legitimated by Fidesz-KDNP’s electoral 
victory, paving the way for “harmonizing” fiscal and monetary policy. 
 
In Turkey, by comparison, it was the proponents of the pre-2008 orthodoxy who 
were particularly critical of the pro-growth, low interest rate policy of the Bank 
during this period (Hurriyet, 2 February 2012). The Bank’s interventions into the 
exchange rate have often been viewed as de facto competitive devaluations 
fueling growth and inflation simultaneously and, therefore, interpreted as the 
Bank’s implicit surrender to government pressure (Parliamentary Debates, 24th 
Term, 2nd- 3rd- 5th Legislative Year, Feb, Nov-Dec 2012, Feb-Apr 2013, Dec 2014). 
The Prime Minister and his Cabinet ministers’ continuous mention of the 
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“interest rate lobby” and the need to support the exporting industries and 
foreign trade have also contributed to such an outcome (Hurriyet, 2 March 2012; 
Akcay, 2014; Birgun, 8 March 2015; Parliamentary Debates, 1 July 2013, 19 Dec 
2014).  
 
The onset of the growing societal politicisation that reached its peak in June 2013 
and the subsequent rifts within the ranks of the state and government set off a 
new period of monetary policy tightening (which subtly ensued in early 2013). It 
included policy rate increases in July 2013 and, finally, a very significant increase 
in January 2014 (CBRT website, Policy Rates Data). The process, while 
demonstrating that the Bank could still exercise its mandate in relation to price 
stability despite delay, also set off a renewed discursive battle between Erdogan 
in particular and the Bank, the recent manifestation of which could be observed 
from early 2015 (Guardian, 23 March 2015; Financial Times, 9, 12 March 2015; 
Parliamentary Debates, Feb-Mar 2015). This trend has become more pronounced 
from late 2015 onwards as the political pressure over the Bank in formulating 
and implementing its monetary policy found more space in the press. Efforts on 
the part of the government to support small and medium sized companies, the 
construction business and Islamic capital have been frequently highlighted (The 
Economist, 2016, 2016a; Al-Monitor, 2017). The internal struggle and sharpening 
contradiction within the capitalist state as revealed in the contested coup 
attempt in the country also contributes to the complex picture in Turkey and the 
underlying dynamics of its divergence from the case of Hungary. In the post- July 
2016 purges, the central bank has been among the many targeted state 
institutions with 105 employees dismissed (Bloomberg, 2017). 
 
In the post-2008 context, the monetary policymaking and central banking has 
been rather discursively politicized by the government without an explicit 
legal/institutional revocation of the independent status of the Bank and its 
operations as observed in Hungary. This, in line with Akcay (2014), indeed meant 
that the formal independence of the Bank continued shielding the government 
from the impact of potential unpopular policies and, simultaneously, accrued 
credibility for those that become successful (Parliamentary Debates, 14 Dec 
2013, 4 Sep 2014).  Building on this arm’s length control over the monetary policy 
pillar in this fashion has allowed space for the government, alongside other 
dynamics, to politicize and articulate a strongly oppressive discourse and practice 
in a number of other issue areas outside economic policy (author details 
removed). Depoliticisation, therefore, was not absolute or all-encompassing. 
While in the case of Hungary, the discursive politicisation was a harbinger of 
governmental politicisation and the latter could be legitimised in the context of 
the ruling government’s seemingly “successful” nationalistic economic policy, the 
Turkish case demonstrates how limiting politicisation to the discursive form in 
monetary policy until recently served to legitimise politicisation of other areas. 
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Conclusion 
This article aimed to shed light on the contested post-crisis dynamics in 
monetary policymaking in two country cases, Hungary and Turkey. The peripheral 
positioning of both countries has previously resulted in a rather constrained 
policy autonomy due to either the formal inclusion (Hungary) or potential 
promise of being part of the European Union (Turkey). In addition, both followed 
the textbook restructuring recipes streamlined by the IMF and EU from the early 
1980s in the Turkish case and 1990s in the case of Hungary. Despite the divergent 
historical trajectories of the two countries, the situation by the late 1990s and 
early 2000s was similar in both cases and in line with the predominant trends 
seen elsewhere within the periphery of global capitalism. This was also the 
ground upon which the post-2008 backlash and search for the so-called 
nationalist alternative governing strategies emerged.  
 
Against such a background, the global crisis played a crucial role in the changing 
trajectory of economic policy making and discourse in both countries- with slight 
temporal variation. The discourse surrounding this trajectory change was more 
about the so–called motto of “turning crisis into opportunity” in Turkey, while in 
Hungary it was rather a nationalist reaction against the EU’s (mis)handling of the 
deepening crisis – with a rationale and final outcome not too dissimilar. The 
constitutive elements of this political discourse throughout the late 2000s also 
carry similar elements in both countries in terms of the victimization of the 
countries under austerity prescriptions of global financial capital and its 
“foreign” representatives and “lobbies”. 
 
While both central banks underwent discursive politicisation, in Hungary this was 
part of a broader nationalist discourse and changing economic paradigm. In 
Turkey it was confined to opportunistic verbal attacks against a backdrop of 
politicisation of several (extra-)economic domains. Moreover, in Hungary, we 
observe a more comprehensive and systematic process of governmental 
politicisation, manifested as overt structural control of central banking alongside 
a major paradigm shift in economic and monetary policy. In the Turkish context, 
we are confronted with a more complex picture due to the presence and 
eventual suppression of a growing left-wing opposition in the post-2013 period 
and the strong explicit rift between different ranks of the state (i.e. Central Bank 
vs. government, government vs. president, judiciary and police as it became 
evident with and escalated further from the corruption scandal of late 2013). The 
latter dynamic, we suggest, may still lead to the overlapping of politicising 
dynamics with depoliticised forms of governing in the Turkish context, while the 
Orban government possesses a stronger grip, enabling a tighter, and more 
centralized control over monetary policy making. Recently more fundamental 
and systematic substantive politicisation efforts have become visible in this policy 
field in Turkey along similar lines to the Hungarian case as highlighted earlier 
(Birgun, 2015; 2015a; 2016; 2016a). 
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These reflections bode well with an understanding which treats the politicizing 
and depoliticising processes as parts of diverse governing strategies of the state 
managers. We contend that these are not necessarily mutually exclusive or 
separable from each other on the basis of a strict historical periodisation, but 
potentially co-existing and overlapping (Burnham, 2014). Our research in the 
context of these two countries also highlights the importance of understanding 
both the process, the goals and (intended/unintended) consequences of 
(de)politicisations. First, both country cases demonstrate how uncontested 
processes of depoliticisation stand on weak foundations of legitimacy and their 
institutions particularly vulnerable during major crises. Second, they 
demonstrate how such crises can trigger various processes of politicisation, 
potentially leading to increasing centralization and repressive governmental 
control. We argue that it is possible to recognize these dynamics if we have a 
contextual understanding of these processes within the historical specificity of 
the capitalist social relations, state-form and modes of governance in particular 
contexts. Conceiving discursive and governmental politicisation as state 
strategies in this manner allows us to uncover that seemingly illiberal, anti-
neoliberal discourses and policies perpetuate the capitalist status quo in 
repressive form in the case of both countries. Such a stance also allows for the 
double critique of the so-called “orthodox” and “unorthodox” economic policies 
without presenting one as an alternative to the other. In this light we would like 
to further pose the question: Does the politicisation process as identified here in 
the cases of Hungary and Turkey lead to policies that are nevertheless shielded 
from contestation and perpetuate existing class and power relations in a context 
which is increasingly centralized and ultimately depoliticising? If so, what forms 
of politicisation can lead to progressive, emancipatory outcomes beyond these 
reactionary state-led variants? The critical assessment of the Turkish and 
Hungarian cases herein sheds light on the need to continue further research in 
this direction with the aim of uncovering these interrelated dynamics and 
demystifying the conflict-ridden nature of social relations and state under 
capitalism. 
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to the hierarchical characteristic of European capitalism which became more overt with the unfolding global 
financial crisis since 2008(Milios and Sotiropoulos, 2010). While identifying Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland as 
the ‘internal periphery’ of the Eurozone in line with Lapavitsas et. al. (2010: 4), Milios and Sotiropoulos (2010: 230) 
emphasise that ‘there is an even sharper division between the core of the Eurozone and several countries in 
Eastern Europe, which might be called the external periphery. Since 2008 the latter has also entered a crisis with 
similar characteristics to that of the internal periphery’ (ibid.). Therefore the concept does not refer to a specific 
typology of state in reified form (peripheral vs. core) (Burnham, 1998 cited in Sutton, 2016). 
2
 The legal and institutional transformation of the management of money in a politicised manner have not been as 
rapid and observable in Turkey with systematic changes in the central bank law and direct political appointments 
from the Cabinet to the central bank governor post as in Hungary in the post-2010 period. However there have 
been incremental legal changes in appointment and selection criteria of the senior bank staff in 2012 and the 
appointment procedure, professional background and experience of the new Governor in 2016 in particular have 
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been criticized strongly in the media (Gurses, 2016). The rise of visible political pressure over the central bank in 
Turkey through the Economic Coordination Board and the recent governmental proposal in changing the Central 
Bank Law, however, have come onto the governmental agenda and become more strongly pronounced in the 
media during the 2015-17 period (Ozatay, 2016. Birgun, 2016a).  
3
 The seven-year long ban on union organisation and activism and party politics following the 1980 military coup 
certainly facilitated the swift adoption of these novel tactics by suppressing active dissent and opposition in the 
public political realm in Turkey. Boratav (1990: 224) suggests that the 1980s witnessed ‘fundamental deterioration 
in the relative economic position of labour in general against capital in general; and, secondarily to important 
changes in the balance of forces within the sub-groups of the dominant classes in the Turkish society’. 
4
 It drastically transformed the ownership structure of the industries towards a concentration in transnational 
corporations, led to profit and income transfers in the medium term and exacerbated the current account 
problems and external debt burden (Gerocs and Pinkasz, 2017). The presence of cheap, highly skilled labour power 
as well as geographical proximity and developed infrastructure was particularly attractive for global capital (ibid.). 
5
 Some analyses highlighted the ‘political’ and ‘institutional entrepreneurship’ of the former WB Vice Governor, 
new Economy Minister Kemal Dervis, in facilitating and justifying this neoliberal policy framework (Bakir, 2009). 
6
 Bakir (2009a: 73) argues that there was also reluctance and ‘ideational rigidity’ within the central bank itself 
towards implementing expansionary monetary policies in this early phase of the unfolding crisis. 
7
 It should be noted that the fixed inflation rate target of 5% has not been met from 2012 onwards but it was 
achieved in 2009 and 2010 thanks to its upward revision (CBRT Website, Inflation Targets Data). Following a brief 
increase in its short term lending rate in 2010 and 2011, CBRT continuously lowered it until the summer of 2013 
while also gradually lowering its borrowing rate until early 2014. 
8
 Nationalism is defined more broadly as “an ideology seeking to establish or promote the unity, identity, and 
autonomy of a nation or potential nation” (Shulman, 2000: 368), while “financial nationalism" is more precisely “an 
economic strategy that employs ﬁnancial levers - including monetary policy, currency interventions, and other 
methods of interaction with local and international ﬁnancial systems - to promote the nation’s unity, autonomy, 
and identity” (Johnson & Barnes, 2015: 536). 
9
 Gyorgy Matolcsy as economy minister (2010-13) had been one of the key authors of the ruling coalition’s 
economic policies which were characteristically pro-Keynesian (e.g., Novak, 2014) and included hiking taxes on 
banks and other sectors, nationalizing private pension assets, and seizing private-sector assets for the state (e.g., 
Reuters, 2013; Than and Peto, 2013). 
10
 Several of the MNB’s policies since Matolcsy’s takeover, including its tendency to reduce interest rates, the 
“Funding for Growth Scheme,” its expanded role as the country’s chief financial supervisory authority (having 
absorbed the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority),its highly controversial spending on real estate and other 
national assets, and its setting up of foundations which were shown to have benefitted close allies of Matolcsy and 
Fidesz are reflective of this policy and discourse. In the interest of space, this paper cannot cover each of these 
issues. 
11
 In response to attempted amendments to the MNB Act, the ECB and wider foreign press sounded concerns (ECB 
Press Release, 2011, 2012). This legal wrangling is illustrative of the government’s attempt to pull the institution 
closer to its political agenda against largely unquestioned orthodox norms of central bank independence. 
12
 The MNB made reference to the link between the passage of the act and the financial crisis. “The  negative 
repercussions  of  the  financial  crisis  in  Hungary  and  the  best practices of several EU Member States have both 
demonstrated that the harmony between macro and micro level supervision is indispensable for the prevention 
and resolution of individual or systemic financial crises.” (Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 2013: 8). 
13
 A period of conservatism commences from January to August 2012, with interest rates either unchanged or 
increased. One interviewee described how “behavior changed” after the crisis, with policy experts becoming more 
“more risk-averse”. In the first half of 2012, the monetary council did toe the line of risk aversion, the majority 
deciding either to increase rates (Simor and his two deputies) or to maintain them at the current level (MNB, 2012: 
7). 
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